Abstract: Food safety and the trade-off between precaution and increased agricultural exports is at the forefront of policy debate. Discussions of food safety standards and their relation to trade have been prominent in many of the position papers developed in advance of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial in Doha set for November 2001, for example. How food safety is addressed within the trading systems is of significant importance to developing countries which continue to rely on agricultural exports. This includes some of the least developed exporters of cereals, fruits, an nuts in Africa, Asia, and Western Hemisphere.
I. Introduction
The need to understand more precisely how food safety regulations affect trade is being driven, to a great extent, as a function of challenges in meeting the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (the "SPS Agreement") of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The SPS Agreement sets general guidelines under which trade in agricultural products is conducted to ensure standards are based on sound scie nce, and does not arbitrarily discriminate or restrict trade. The WTO rules do allow members to set domestic standards at any level they deem appropriate, however, governments are encouraged to use international standards-where they exist. The WTO disciplines suggest, therefore, that harmonization and equivalence are the preferred methods of ensuring non-discrimination. A fragmented system of unilateral action on food safety standards is counter to both general WTO principles, and economically inefficie nt due to high transaction costs for exporters and global consumers. Although there is only limited empirical data in this field, it is assumed that developing countries are most directly affected by a fragmented system in which firms must meet differing standards for multiple export markets.
In the food trade, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) plays a central role in setting internationally acceptable standards. While governments through Codex have made progress in crafting harmonized standards in some areas, through the Commission consensus on key international food safety standards is lacking while national standards proliferate. Since regulatory requirements and product standards are substantially different across countries, typically between developed and developing countries (World Bank, 2001) , trade disputes in a non-harmonized system are inevitable. 1 The rising number of notifications to the WTO from developed and developing countries about national sanitary and phytosanitary standards (a 26 percent increase from 1995 to 1998) reflects this fact. Understanding the trade impact of these differing standards, therefore, is of significant importance and an area of key public policy concern as options to expand trade in agricultural products are examined. This paper analyzes how global trade patterns in selected food products will change when differing levels of aflatoxin B1 standard are assumed. Aflatoxins are a group of toxic substances that can contaminate certain foods. There is evidence that aflatoxin B1 contamination is linked to liver cancer . The analysis here extends Otsuki et al. (2001b) by broadening the country coverage from Africa to a global scope, and by explicitly examining how imports and exports differ under various regulatory scenarios.
The paper examines trade among 15 importing (4 developing) countries and 31 (21 developing) exporting countries in the world. All of these countries are WTO members except for Russia, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam. These three countries are, h owever, observers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the concepts and debates over food safety regulations in general in the world food trade. Section III reviews issues related to aflatoxin regulations and world food trade. Section IV develops the empirical methodology to estimate the effect of aflatoxin regulations on bilateral trade flows.
1 One example of the widely different approach to standards and food safety among trading partners is the new European Union (EU) maximum allowable level of aflatoxins in cereals, dried and preserved fruits and nut imports. This regulation, set for implementation in April 2002, has generated concern among exporting countries, many of them developing countries. Among the countries expressing concerns over the new EU standards were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay and the US (1998, CRC Press LLC).
Section V then reports the results, and Section VI concludes and discusses the policy implications.
II. World Food Safety Regulations and Trade
Food safety regulations are mandatory controls over the quality attributes of a final product, based on the potential effects on human health from food handling, preparation, or consumption (Hooker 1999) . The growing prominence of food safety controls in the public policy debate is based on both scientific and economic grounds (Henson and Caswell 1999) . The role of science in forming food safety regulations includes the assessment of risk of food related hazards, the management of risk at a socially acceptable level, and the release of information about risk to the public. The economic basis for food safety regulation emerges out of the concept of a "socially optimum" level of risk at which the marginal costs of food safety regulations equal their marginal benefits to the society.
What about trade rules and food safety? The WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement disciplines play an important role in promoting harmonization of food safety standards. The Agreement was entered into force as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements in January, 1995. The overall goal of the Agreement is to ensure transparency and non-discrimination in how governments can apply food safety, animal, and plant health regulations.
SPS measures also address issues relating to market failures involved with imperfect information on food safety that can arise when consumers cannot pay for desired levels of safety and/or producers fail to supply improved food safety (IATRC 2001 Food safety measures may have different implications in terms of the welfare effects in different countries depending on the differences in risk perceptions, available market information, the incidence of risk in production, and traditional methods of food processing and preparation as noted by IATRC (2001) . The benefits of food safety regulation are reductions in risks of morbidity and mortality associated with the consumption of contaminated food (Antle, 1999) . The costs of food safety regulation include the cost of production, the compliance cost, the administrative cost borne by the taxpayers, and the deadweight loss associated with taxation (Antle). According to Henson and Caswell (1999) Henson and Caswell (1999) , there are two approaches through which national food safety regulations can be justified. First, is the adoption of international standards that are assumed to comply with the provision of SPS agreement. Second, is the assessment of the risks to human health, plants and animal life, as per food safety regulations.
III. The Regulation of Aflatoxins
The regulation of aflatoxins in food products has gained considerable attention in recent years. Aflatoxins are a group of structurally related toxic compounds that contaminate certain foods and have been associated with acute liver carcinogens in humans. The different types of poisonous aflatoxins found in food are B1, B2, G1 and G2 (UNDP-FAO, 2000) . Aflatoxin B1 is the most toxic and common aflatoxin. It is generally present in corn and corn products, groundnuts and groundnut products, cottonseed milk, and tree nuts, e.g. Brazil nuts, pecans, pistachio nuts, and walnuts (FAO-WHO,1997) . In 1997, a Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) estimated that reducing the aflatoxin standard from 20 ppb (part per billion) to 10 ppb will decrease 2 cancer deaths a year per billion people.
In 1997, the European Commission (EC) proposed a harmonization of maximum acceptable level of aflatoxins in certain foodstuffs. The standard ranged from 4ppb in cereals, edible nuts, and dried fruit, to 10ppb for nuts that are subject to further processing. Henson et al. (2000) noted that the EC proposal had led to concern among food exporters about the new and more restrictive standards' effect on trade patterns.
Several exporting countries feared losses in their exports as a result of the more restrictive standard. Countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, India, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, Uruguay, Australia, and Pakistan requested detailed risk assessments from the European Union used in designing the new standard. As a consequence of consultations with their trading partners about these concerns, the European Commission relaxed the proposed aflatoxin standard in cereals, dried fruits, and nuts.
The revised aflatoxin standard in groundnuts subject to further processing was set at 15 ppb (8 ppb for B1) and 10 ppb (5 ppb for B1) for other nuts and dried fruits subject to further processing. For cereals, dried fruits, and nuts intended for direct human consumption, the standard was much more stringent and was set at 4 ppb (2 ppb for B1).
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The aflatoxin standards suggested by Codex is significantly more relaxed than the EU standards. While Codex does set a standard specifically for B1 group of aflatoxin, it assumes that 50-70 percent or around 7.5-10.5 ppb of the total aflatoxin level of 15 ppb is caused by aflatoxin B1. The overall Codex standard, therefore, is approximately 9ppb. 
IV. An Econometric Model to Examine Trade and Food Safety Standards
When a measure of stringency of standards is available, an econometric approach has an advantage in measuring the statistical relationship between standards and trade flow, without prior imposition of the sign of the effect. It is also useful for examining policy implications once the relationship is estimated. Swann et al. (1996) A gravity model is used to explain bilateral trade flows using key economic variables that represent the size of a country's economy, such as Gross National Product (GNP) and population, and geographical distance between variable countries. When combined with data on food safety standards in importing countries, bilateral trade flow data allows analysis of how differing standards promote or limit trade between pairs of importing and exporting countries.
Our specification of gravity model is as follows: Products with Aflatoxin B1 contamination above ST are retained in the exporting country, or rejected at the importing country's border. In this respect, a country that exports food products to more than one country faces different aflatoxin standards.
Positive trade flows in COMTRADE data recorded from country to country with different standards imply that countries export food products with differing levels of aflatoxin contamination. Under the fragmented system of standard setting, aflatoxin standards for food safety tend to be heterogeneous within a given exporting country (e.g.
there are production and distribution channels that satisfy different aflatoxin standards).
The standards of exporting countries, therefore, do not necessarily measure minimum level of aflatoxin contamination in their exports.
The coefficient for this variable in our gravity model generally implies changes in exports associated with an incremental change (relaxation or tightening) in ST. If this standard does limit trade, then this coefficient is expected to be positive.
A dummy variable for colonial ties is included i n order to control the omitted variable effect of colonial ties on trade flow as used in Otsuki et al. (2001a Otsuki et al. ( , 2001b Union, ASEAN, NAFTA and MERCOSUR, respectively. Dummy variables for the year also are included in the model, in order to control for systematic differences across time.
V. Results
Separate regressions are run for three product groups, cereals, nut products and dried and preserved fruits using an fixed-effects model. Following the models developed
by Otsuki et al. (2001a Otsuki et al. ( , 2001b ), a panel is formed, with respect to exporting countries whose unobserved characteristics that are country-specific, may cause systematic variation.
Results are reported in Table 2 . 3 The results generally supports the conclusion that the gravity model is well suited to examine all product groups in the analysis. The coefficients for distance are negative and are significant for all of the product groups.
The coefficients for per-capita GNP in importing countries are positive and significant for all of the product groups. The results for per-capita GNP are not predictable in prior due to two counteractive effects, domestic absorption and the scale effect on production.
We find that aflatoxin B1 standards in importing countries have a negative effect on trade flows in the cereals and nuts regression. The impact of the standard is insignificant in the dried and preserved fruits regression. The first two results are consistent with the findings in Otsuki et al. (2001b) . When global trade is examined in cereals and nuts, we find that a more stringent standard tends to limit trade. The results for dried and preserved fruits indicates, however, that the negative effect of the aflatoxin standard cannot be generalized globally.
The EU dummy is found to be positive and significant for all of the product groups. The Mercosur dummy is found to be positive and significant for cereals and dried and preserved fruits, but is insignificant for cereals. The results for the other FTA dummies do not show a strong support for the trade-promoting effect of a FTA.
Simulation Exercises Under Various Scenarios
In this section, we predict how trade patterns change, as aflatoxin B1 standards are harmonized at varying levels. We make the following assumptions prior to conducting the simulation analysis. The first relates to the effect of an exporting country's standard on its exports. We do not have data on exporting country standards in all of the cases. Importing and exporting countries are treated independently, therefore, such that an assumed level of aflatoxin B1 standard of a country as an importer does not imply the level of maximum aflatoxin B1 contamination of its exports of the same product.
The fixed-effects model coefficient estimates on the standard variable are used to predict changes in trade flows associated with different levels of aflatoxin B1 standards. The results are reported in Table 4 . They suggest that the value of exports under case (1) is US $ 995 million (8.3 percent) less compared to the case (2). Hungary, Israel and Brazil are found to be gainers from the EU harmonized standard. Their largest trading partner of cereals and nuts is Austria, which had a 1 ppb standard prior to the harmonization. The other importing countries in the exercise are all expected to decrease exports .
Scenario Two: In this case, the comparison is between (1) all importing countries adopting a standard of 2ppb and (2) Europe implements its 2ppb standard and all other countries stay at 1998 levels of regulatory stringency. As shown in Table 5 the value of exports under case (1) is US$ 5.1 billion (46 percent) lower when compared to case (2).
This implies that trade becomes much more restricted when all importers adopt the EU harmonized standard.
While there is not an obvious pattern of distribution of gainers and losers in scenario 1, scenario 2 shows a clear contrast in the difference between developed and developing countries. The global harmonization at 2 ppb generates more loss for non-OECD countries than OECD countries. This is because the change in standards in non-OECD importing countries is more drastic than that in OECD countries given standards are less stringent in non-OECD today. Non-OECD countries that export primarily to other non-OECD countries tend to lose from a world wide harmonization of standards at 2ppb.
Scenario Three:
The third scenario compares (1) a harmonization under a breakeven condition where the sums of loss and gains from a harmonized standard are equal and (2) all importing countries standards remain unchanged from their 1998 levels. As Table 6 indicates, the majority of non-OECD exporting countries are losers whereas OECD countries are primarily gainers in this scenario. The OECD member countries are estimated to gain by US$ 536 million or 7.7 percent of the total exports from the OECD member countries in the sample. In contrast, the non-OECD countries are estimated to lose by US$ 502 million or 10 percent of the total exports from the non OECD countries in the sample.
Scenario Four: In this case, we examine trade flow when (1) all countries adopt an international standard of 9ppb in contrast to (2) all importing countries remaining at 1998 standards. Harmonization at the Codex level is estimated to increase the value of cereal and nut exports by US$ 6.1 billion or 51 percent of the status-quo level of 1998.
The results reported in Table 7 indicates that the value of exports under the case
(1) generates US$ 6 billion more than the case (2). In this scenario the EU countries e.g. Table 7 suggest that harmonization at the 2 ppb level across all the importing countries will result in US$ 12.2 billion or 67 percent decrease in cereal and nut exports. Some of the losing exporters under case (1) Combined with the result in Table 5 , the case (2) will result in $US 7.1 billion (64 percent) more exports than the case where only EU harmonizes standard at 2 ppb leaving other importing countries unchanged their standards.
In sum, the country-level analysis indicates that the value of exports from EU countries are relatively unaffected by the EU harmonized standard whereas developing countries are mostly losers from the harmonization.
In the final simulation, changes in value of trade flow are computed for each importing and exporting country. The trading partner within the sample countries which account for the largest gain and loss of trade flow is then identified. Table 9 and 10 contain all the results. Germany and Austria constitute for more than 90 percent of the gains. This reinstates the fact that EU countries have had the most stringent standard in the world and thus they are better off when standards are relaxed to 5.1 for cereals and 4.7 for nuts at the break even point. France is the major exporting partner to most of the EU importing countries. The harmonization thus will tend to increase intra-regional trade in EU or industrialized countries in general. India suffers the biggest loss in imports, with Thailand as its trading partner whose trade flow will decrease the most. This result confirms that India has the most lax standards (30 ppb) of all the importing countries in the sample. gaining from the harmonization are also EU countries, Germany, UK and Austria. This also confirms that the harmonization at the break-even point will greatly increase intra-EU trade. It should be noted that the trading partners(i.e. the importers) of the gainers are the countries with very s tringent aflatoxin standard. Hence it is obvious that harmonization at the break even point benefits the six EU countries, the gains coming from countries moving to relatively lax standard from very stringent standard. On the other hand, most developing countries lose exports as a result of harmonization.
Countries like Canada, Mexico, Australia and Pakistan who feared losses due to the stringent standards set by EU (2 ppb), suffer a loss in exports even from harmonization at the break-even point. With stringent standard level at EU harmonization, some countries in table 10 (e.g. Israel, Egypt) with very small gains are likely to lose . It is interesting to note that developing countries like India and Nigeria gain as exporters as a result of harmonization even though as importers they lose. This is due to the separation assumption on the base model for simulation. The change in the value of exports and imports of these countries are computed as though they were different countries. Hence, it is possible that India and Nigeria have the EU countries as their trading partners and hence, gain as exporters as a result of relaxation of standard in the EU due to harmonization. USA and Canada will also decrease their exports due to the contraction of mutua l trade since their standards are more lax than the break-even level.
Simulation results in table 10 shows that U.S. and Canada lose in exports as a consequence of harmonization at the break-even point. Authors' calculation based on the UN COMTRADE data records report that U.S. and Canada experienced a 5.6% decline in exports in the global market between 1995-1998 . 5 Hence, it is reasonable to assume that harmonization of aflatoxin standard in general (may be different from the break even point level) will adversely affect U.S. and Canada as exporters. However, the effect of harmonization on European Union countries is imprecise. These countries experience a positive change in exports at the break-even point whereas UN COMTRADE data records show that there is a downward trend of 3.2% in exports for these countries between 1995-1998. Hence, the net effect of harmonization is hard to predict. On the The results in this analysis are combined to predict how the direction of trade is altered by food safety regulations under alternative scenarios. We find that adopting an international standard for aflatoxin B1 based on current Codex guidelines will increase cereal and nut trade among countries in the exercise by $US 6.1 billion, or 51 percent from the 1998 levels. It is $US 12.2 billion or 67 percent more than the value of exports under the case where all 15 importing countries harmonize their standards at the 2 ppb level. Moreover, we estimate that world exports would rise by $38.8 billion if an international standard (Codex) were adopted, compared to the current divergent national standards in place. Exports are estimated to decrease by $3.1 billion if the world adopted the EU standard (i.e. 2 ppb) compared to current national standards.
Harmonization of this food safety standard at a level more stringent than one suggested by international standards indicates that food safety standards can severely limit developing country exports. This analysis reveals, moreover, the trade impact of a fragmented food safety system in which national regulations differ across trading
partners. An initiative to encourage international standards, along with mechanisms to directly assist developing countries in raising standards to international levels merits serious consideration. In this specific case of aflatoxin standards, one might consider programs to provide vaccination against hepatitis B to lower risk of liver cancer (along with other serious health risks), encouraging the development of an international standard to be adopted worldwide, and aid to the least developed producers of agricultural commodities most affected by aflatoxin contaminations. 
